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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  The advent of autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) would change the nature of 
work throughout the economy, with 
potential harm for some workers, 
their communities, and families.
n  Effects on workers would likely 
mount slowly and peak between the 
late 2040s and early 2050s, raising the 
U.S. unemployment rate by 0.06−0.13 
percentage points and causing average 
wealth losses of $80,000–$120,000 per 
displaced worker. 
n  Workforce costs could be reduced  
by addressing gaps that slow 
transitions: skills, geography, worker 
voice, and investment.  
n  To avoid costly layoffs, employers 
can actively retain and retrain 
workers, and policymakers can 
strengthen the workforce development 
system by improving data, coverage, 
flexibility, reliance on evidence, 
efficiency, and employer engagement 
with worker representatives.
n  Policymakers and employers have 
time to invest to avoid AVs’ otherwise 
consequential costs to workers and 
their communities. In so doing, they 
will also lessen resistance to future 
U.S. innovation.  
For additional details, see see https://
research.upjohn.org/up_technicalreports/36/.
Over a dozen companies are developing autonomous vehicles (AVs) for commercial, 
transit, and personal use. We’ve seen some in action in videos or on city streets. When 
we see them, our frst concern may be safety, but next is ofen fear of lost jobs. AVs 
have the potential to lower the costs of goods and services, generate new jobs, and even 
build new industries. However, a transition to AVs will create challenges: changes in the 
nature of work in transportation and beyond will likely harm some workers and their 
communities. 
Te U.S. labor market is resilient, and workers have proven their ability to learn new 
skills over time. AVs will catalyze many new jobs, the nature, location, and timing of 
which we can’t precisely anticipate. Te fip side is that some tasks, particularly driving, 
will become less necessary. 
To grapple with these issues, we have designed a framework to clarify the nature of 
AVs’ workforce impacts. We have reviewed past innovations for lessons, gauged the size 
and timing of the coming disruptions, and advanced policy recommendations. 
We fnd that the workforce impacts of adopting AVs will be consequential but far 
from catastrophic. All told, 1.3−2.3 million workers may be displaced due to adoption 
of AVs. Layofs will likely mount gradually, with a peak between the late 2040s and early 
2050s under current deployment forecasts. At peak, this will add between 0.06 and 0.13 
percentage points to the U.S. unemployment rate. 
Now isn’t the time to panic, but policymakers and business leaders cannot aford 
complacency either. Tis impact is similar in size to the recent “China shock” to U.S. 
manufacturing jobs. 
Smart choices can help close four gaps that impose costs on workers and interfere 
with employers fnding the workers they need: 1) skills, 2) geography, 3) worker voice, 
and 4) investment. Specifcally, employers can actively retain and retrain workers to 
avoid costly layofs. Policymakers can strengthen our workforce development system 
by improving data, coverage, fexibility, reliance on evidence, and engagement with 
employers. Both should use available time to invest in the workforce to avoid AVs’ 
otherwise consequential costs and, in so doing, promote U.S. innovation going forward. 
Lessons from History and Framework for AVs’ Workforce Impact 
Labor market impacts of previous disruptive changes can provide lessons for the 
current situation. Importantly, in our dynamic economy, losing one set of jobs does not 
lower employment permanently. New jobs are ofen created when others are lost. For 
example, although farm jobs have dropped from 50 percent of the total at the turn of the 
20th century to just 2 percent today, the majority of Americans are still employed, and we 
produce more food than in the past. Technological change can thus lead to large social 
benefts in the long run. 
Yet, benefts can be long delayed and the change can impose signifcant costs on 
displaced workers and their communities. Hence, there are two reasons for concern 
about the impending adoption of AVs. First, losses tend to accumulate before widespread 
gains, substantially afecting particular people and geographic and demographic 
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Te central risk from 
large disruptions stems 
not from a permanent 
decline in jobs but 
from costs imposed on 
displaced workers. 
consequential losses are largely uncompensated and can fuel unrest and resistance to 
innovation. Second, the size and distribution of benefts are also difcult to predict. In 
particular, wage stagnation, even in the face of signifcant productivity gains over recent 
decades, casts doubt on whether the benefts of a technology like AVs would indeed 
be shared, and causes worry among those who already believe they are just getting by. 
During the Industrial Revolution, U.S. real wages fell for 50 years—reversed only by 
policy steps, including collective bargaining laws, child-labor laws, public high school, 
and extended voting rights. 
In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that the advent of AVs and, more 
generally, artifcial intelligence technology will result in a diferent mix of efects than 
in the past. In particular, artifcial intelligence may lead to greater automation of high-
skilled work and thus adversely afect higher-paying jobs and skills. 
Figure 1 establishes a framework to help trace the labor market impacts of AVs, 
drawing on both historical experience and economic theory. It clarifes that the central 
risk from large disruptions stems not from a permanent decline in jobs but from costs 
imposed on displaced workers and potentially slow adjustments to the disruption. 
Eventually, new jobs will return the economy to full employment afer the job losses from 
AV adoption. Tree forces create new jobs: 
1) People will use more transportation when it becomes less expensive and safer. 
2) Suppliers of AV-related goods and services will expand to meet demand. 
3) Consumers will increase purchases of other goods and services with money saved 
when transportation becomes safer and cheaper. 
However, an eventual return to full employment misses the heart of the matter. 
How large are losses to workers, how long will adjustments take, and what can we do to 
mitigate the costs? Te framework points to four gaps that make workers’ adjustments 
slower and costlier: 
1) Displaced workers may not have the skills needed for new jobs. 
2) Tey may not live in the same areas where new jobs arise. 
Figure 1  Impact of Adoption of Autonomous Vehicles on the Labor Market 
Lost jobs 
and income 
We buy more 
transportation 
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SOURCE: Authors, inspired by Joss Fong, “Why the rise of the robots won’t mean the end of work,”Vox, November 
13, 2017. 
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Technology alone does 
not determine outcomes 
such as the quality of 
new jobs. 
3) Lack of worker voice, bargaining power, and supportive institutions could mean 
that workers’ losses are exacerbated. 
4) Firms may lack the ability or will to invest because of poor economic conditions 
or other impediments. 
Te historical cases we reviewed demonstrate that technology alone does not 
determine outcomes such as the quality of new jobs. We have not managed past 
transitions well. Te average displaced American worker loses signifcant lifetime wealth 
(1.5−2.0 years of predisplacement earnings) from lost work time and lower hours and 
wages afer reemployment. 
Simulation of Impacts 
We use our framework to simulate key impacts of AV adoption over the next few 
decades. We consider four adoption scenarios developed by Securing America’s Future 
Energy: 
1) Cars-Personal: Passenger vehicles owned by households, as is now the case 
2) Cars-Fleet: Passenger vehicles owned by feets, where a set of transportation 
service providers own and operate most cars and light trucks 
3) Trucking-Slow: Commercial trucking with slow adoption, taking about 30 years 
to move from driver-assisted autonomous vehicles to trucks that do not need 
drivers at all 
4) Trucking-Fast: Commercial trucking with aggressive adoption, proceeding to full 
autonomy much more quickly 
We base our simulations on the experiences of recently displaced workers, data on 
the occupations likely afected, and estimated earnings losses from displacement. We 
follow previous studies in identifying at-risk occupations, building on occupational 
classifcations identifed as “driving related” by the U.S. Commerce Department. In 
consultation with industry experts, we set the percentage of workers in each occupation 
who are at risk of layof under each AV scenario. Tese include truck and bus drivers, 
taxi and other personal transport employees, and other drivers. We consider other 
job losses from the adoption of AVs, such as automobile insurance adjusters, auto 
repair mechanics, and police patrol ofcers. We adjust these job losses for projected 
occupational turnover (workers leaving occupations for reasons other than the rise of 
AVs) to produce estimates of displacement. 
From recent U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced Worker Surveys we construct 
the likely path followed by a cohort of displaced workers, who can shif between three 
possible labor force states (employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force) in the years 
afer displacement. 
With this information, for each of the four scenarios, we simulate how AV adoption 
will afect the number of unemployed workers and labor force exits over the coming 
decades. We fnd that the introduction of AVs could directly eliminate between 1.3 and 
2.3 million workers’ jobs over the next 30 years, depending on the adoption scenario 
followed. Figure 2 shows the consequences for the unemployment rate by year for 
combinations of the four scenarios. Efects on workers will likely grow gradually, with 
peak unemployment impacts expected between the late 2040s and early 2050s under 
current deployment forecasts. AV-related displacement is expected to add 0.06−0.013 
percentage points, at peak, to the U.S. unemployment rate. 
Displaced workers stand to lose an average of about $80,000–$120,000 each in lifetime 
earnings from lost work hours and lower subsequent wages. Aggregated across the next 
several decades as AVs deploy, this would translate into wealth losses of $100−$200 
billion for the AV-afected workforce and their families and communities—or up to $300 
billion if the job losses happen during a recession. 
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Figure 2  Autonomous Vehicles’ Impact on Additional Unemployment, by Year and 
Adoption Scenario We have not managed 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
We also fnd that another 7.7 million workers are likely to see their duties change 
because they are in occupations with secondary, driving-related duties (such as home 
health aides, building contractors, visiting nurses, and real estate agents). AVs should 
increase productivity in these occupations, but the impact on wages and number of jobs 
is very uncertain. 
While it is tempting to view these fgures as small relative to the workforce as a whole, 
the displacements are concentrated among professional drivers and in certain geographic 
areas. Te magnitude of the impact and its concentration is similar to the recent “China 
shock” to U.S. manufacturing jobs in the past two decades. 
Policy Recommendations 
Ignoring likely labor disruptions from AVs could fuel a backlash against acceptance 
of AVs and future innovations. Tus, to help at-risk communities, policymakers may be 
tempted to stall the deployment of AVs to provide greater time for workforce adaptation. 
Such eforts may prove counterproductive. Not only will a lag in deployment delay the 
societal benefts of AVs, but the United States risks ceding global leadership in this 
industry. 
Unlocking AVs’ benefts and mitigating long-lasting impacts to the U.S. workforce 
require moving forward on AV technology while simultaneously addressing our 
workforce development infrastructure and encouraging retention and retraining. Many 
policy options are available. With robust workforce statistics, communication among 
stakeholders, program evaluations, and an enhanced workforce development system, the 
task is manageable but requires attention as soon as possible. Te economic benefts of 
AVs, which some have estimated at nearly $1 trillion per year, should provide adequate 
resources for such policy intervention. 
Te authors gratefully acknowledge funding from Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a nonproft group 
focused on reducing U.S. oil dependence. Although we focus on labor market impacts of AVs, SAFE reports have 
shown that other benefts and costs could also be large. 
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